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Abstract— Studies dealing with productivity in female 
(FHH) and male headed households (MHH) find that 
FHH appear to be either less, equally, or more 
productive compared to MHH. Lower productivity of 
FHH is often explained by insecure access to land, while 
the findings of higher productivity largely remain 
unexplained. This paper is an attempt to reconcile these 
contrasting findings by constructing a model that 
accounts for productivity effects arising from secure 
land rights and the risk of falling short of income. Both 
affect productivity, but they do so in opposite directions. 
While tenure insecurity tends to decrease labor effort, 
income risks increase it as subsistence farmers want to 
avoid falling (deeper) into poverty. Depending on which 
of these risks prevails in the perception of farmers, they 
become either more or less productive than a 
benchmark farmer who faces none of these constraints. 
The model is tested using data from Kenya where FHH 
are categorized by different land tenure security 
schemes. The results from a stochastic cost frontier 
model establish that FHH facing tenure insecurity are 
less productive compared to MHH. However, this result 
only obtains in case households do not face income risks. 
Keywords— Female headed households, tenure 
insecurity, income risk 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Despite the often reproduced result of low 
productivity of FHH, other studies report mixed 
results. In their investigation of improved crop variety 
adoption, Dossa and Morris (2001) find that the 
adoption rate of hybrid maize is equal among FHH 
and MHH in Ghana. However, FHH were less likely 
to adopt modern varieties of other crops. Analyzing 
data from Benin and Malawi, Minot et al. (2000) find 
that FHH in Malawi are more likely to use fertilizer 
than MHH. For the case of Benin, there are no 
significant differences. In other instances, studies 
report that FHH achieve the same yield per hectare or 
produce even more than MHH (Bindlish and Evenson 
1993, Moock 1976). In sum, it seems impossible to 
make a priori predictions on the productivity of FHH 
since they turn out to be less, equally or more 
productive compared with MHH.  
This paper is an attempt to reconcile these findings 
by constructing a model that accounts for productivity 
effects which arise from tenure insecurity and the risk 
of falling short of income. Both affect productivity 
through the supply of labor, but they do so in opposite 
directions. While tenure insecurity tends to decrease 
labor effort, income risks increase it as subsistence 
farmers want to avoid falling (deeper) into poverty. 
Depending on which of these risks prevails in the 
perception of farmers, they become either more or less 
productive than a benchmark farmer who faces none 
of these constraints.
1  
A common prediction on how risk averse farmers 
respond to tenure uncertainty, is that they reduce effort 
and investment, i.e. they produce less output as 
compared to a risk neutral farmer (Feder et al. 1985, 
Besley 1995). A theoretical justification can be found 
in Sandmo (1971) who introduced price uncertainty 
into the profit maximization problem of a competitive 
firm. A major result of his study is that firms respond 
to uncertainty by reducing inputs and consequently 
produce less output. However, the theory has serious 
shortcomings when applied to the context of 
subsistence farming, where part of the output is 
consumed by the producers. Subsistence farmers 
cannot afford to reduce effort since lower output 
implies that they would fall into even deeper poverty. 
Early concerns about the applicability of Sandmo's 
model to subsistence farming are stated by 
Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) who theoretically 
demonstrate that depending on the share of home 
consumption and the income elasticity of household 
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1 It should be noted that the concept of productivity used here 
does not imply that farmers in rural areas of developing 
countries do produce on a large scale. The produced output is 
often only slightly above the poverty line and being (relatively) 
productive often implies to produce a little more than in an 
environment that does not impose any risks on the farmer.   2 
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demand for the subsistence good, farmers may well 
produce more when exposed to income risk. They also 
find that the common Arrow-Pratt measure of risk 
aversion falls short in measuring the true risk aversion 
of subsistence farmers.  
The model developed in this paper as well as the 
subsequent empirical analysis establish that how 
farmers respond to the risk associated with tenure 
insecurity depends on the availability of alternative 
income options which guarantee a certain level of 
income. A major finding presented here is that farmers 
switch between two different states which are 
determined by the probability of falling short of 
income. If this risk is high, farmers cannot afford to 
adjust their production to other risks like tenure 
insecurity as they otherwise would be even poorer. On 
the other hand, when the risk to fall into poverty is 
low, farmers respond to tenure insecurity by reducing 
production. This they do at an increasing rate, the farer 
they get ahead from their subjective poverty line.
2 The 
mixed results concerning the productivity of FHH in 
comparison to MHH may therefore be explained by 
their different exposures to income risk.  
Studies concerned with comparisons of agricultural 
production between FHH and MHH usually neglect 
the fact that the concept of a FHH is multifaceted and 
not easily subsumed under a single heading. FHH may 
be distinguished according to a number of criteria as 
for example the marital status of the head of 
household, whether a woman is the household 
decision maker or the main income earner, etc. By 
applying these criteria, different implications arise for 
the welfare of the different categories of FHH (Dreze 
and Srinivasan 1997, Fuwa 2000, Kennedy and Peters 
1992, Rosenhouse 1989). Furthermore, in some 
regions marital status, demographic characteristics and 
the position of a woman as being the main household 
decision maker determine the security of land rights, 
implying that each type of FHH should exhibit 
different patterns of production.  
Tenure insecurity is not the only risk that women as 
heads of household are facing. Outmigrating husbands 
often leave the household and literally take the farm 
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2 The risk of falling short of income is at least partly a subjective 
risk as it depends on the personal perception of being poor or 
not. This is the reason why I am not referring to an explicit 
poverty line in the empirical section. 
decision power with them, such that women are not 
allowed to do any on-farm investment decisions or 
crop choices. In what follows, I treat tenure insecurity 
and low levels of decision making competence 
interchangeably as they lead to the same conclusion 
regarding the incentive structure to invest in 
productivity increases.  
Although the welfare implications arising from 
different forms of FHH have been investigated, as yet 
no study was done on the production side of FHH in 
smallholder farming in sub-Saharan Africa. Using a 
large scale household survey from Kenya which 
provides detailed information on household 
characteristics and farming, I distinguish eight 
different categories of FHH, each of which associated 
with a different scheme of incentives to invest into 
farming and investigate whether these household 
categories are sufficiently different to exhibit 
household specific patterns of production arising from 
different sets of constraints these households are 
subjected to.  
II. THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFYING FHH 
The most common way to classify FHH is self-
reported headship which is a standard question in most 
household surveys. Usage of this indicator in 
empirical studies is based on the assumption that FHH 
are a homogeneous group, thus ignoring that there are 
many ways out of which a FHH can emerge and 
according to which FHH can be categorized. One 
possible further classification is marital status, which 
includes marriage, widowhood, or divorced women. 
Another category may be demographic characteristics 
of the household. A significant number of FHH result 
from temporary outmigration of the husband, seeking 
employment in urban areas. Another example is 
polygamy which is still a wide spread pattern of 
family organization in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Polygamous households are often part of a larger 
household compound which is not necessarily 
captured by household surveys. Such a household may 
be identified as a FHH, although it belongs to an array 
of different but related household units where usually 
a man is responsible for household decisions. It is 
likely that such households operate under entirely   3 
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different conditions as compared to widows or 
unmarried women.  
These criteria, though important means to identify 
different categories of FHH, do not comprise further 
interesting cases. Many FHH are characterized by the 
fact that men are entirely or in part responsible for on-
farm decision making while in other cases women are 
the sole decision makers. Kennedy and Peters 1992 
have classified these groups as de facto and de jure 
FHH, where only in the latter the woman is considered 
to be the legal and customary household decision 
maker. A de facto FHH on the other hand is 
characterized by a married woman whose husband is 
absent most of the time. Women in these households 
are not necessarily the principal household decision 
maker.  
Before classifying FHH, it is necessary to ask for 
the specific constraints that women face. Women in 
many sub-Saharan African countries are 
disadvantaged in terms of access to land, which 
translates into difficulties to obtain credits and 
therefore agricultural inputs (see Gopal and Salim 
(1998) for an extensive review of women and land 
rights in Eastern Africa). In some cases, women are 
not allowed to register land in their names and are thus 
dependent on a male relative, be it their husband, 
father, brother, son, etc., who can hold a title for them. 
Even where legal reforms have brought about the right 
for women to possess land as in Kenya, men often 
registered all household land in their names, even if it 
customarily belonged to the woman. If the owner of 
the land title dies or separates, the woman may lose 
access rights to land as the titles are often passed to a 
male member of the family.  
Land that is not entitled in the farmer's name cannot 
be used as collateral for obtaining credits, which 
inhibits the adoption of improved crop varieties and 
complementary inputs. Lack of collateral has been 
found to be a major reason why women tend to be 
excluded from credit programs (Saito et al. 1994). 
Failure to adopt modern technologies would therefore 
arise not necessarily due to a generally imperfect input 
market, but as a consequence of characteristics 
inherent to the social status of women farmers.  But 
there are further issues that disadvantage women. Doss 
and Doss and Morris report that male extension 
workers are reluctant to visit women such that women 
are further constrained in obtaining information. 
Finally, men may be important for establishing 
business contacts and are often responsible for 
marketing cash crops. In rural Kenya, men often serve 
as middlemen between women and the market for 
capital goods and agricultural inputs (Savane 1986).  
Whether a woman as head of household faces such 
constraints depends on the way out of which female 
headship has emerged. The death of the husband is an 
exogenous shock that immediately changes the 
woman's economic and social status. Such shock may 
imply that access to land becomes insecure. This holds 
also for the case of Kenya where, although land is 
legally a private property that can be sold, the major 
means to access land is through the family. Among the 
Kikuyu, who constitute the largest ethnic group in 
Kenya, land is allotted along patrilineages, where the 
`guardian' of the lineage assigns land to the sons. This 
is mostly done upon marriage, but can also happen 
before. The married son who receives the land is 
obliged to give a certain share of the land to his wife 
such that marriage guarantees access to land for 
women. Therefore, within marriage, women have 
relatively secure land rights. However, she cannot sell 
any land received from the family. Women are also 
excluded from inheriting land. Even though the 
Kenyan law has by now legalized the bequest of land 
to daughters, most family elders continue to give the 
land exclusively to sons (Davison 1988).  
Under the British colonial rule, land entitlements 
have been introduced in the course of the Swynnerton 
Plan that came into law in 1954. The major aim of the 
plan was to reform land ownership system by 
introducing a formal land entitlement system that 
induces agricultural development through setting 
proper incentives.
3 A result of this effort was that 
many men took the chance to register all family land 
in their names. Even though, their wives were 
formerly granted land for cultivation, women had no 
possibility to claim that land legally.  
As noted, within marriage, women's access to land 
is secure and land cannot be taken away by the 
husband. The woman also often exercises the right to 
control the produce of the land and to decide what to 
                                                           
3. 
3 Although the Swynnerton plan was launched in 1954, its 
implementation is still ongoing as a lot of land has not yet been 
registered.   4 
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crop and what to sell. Hence, as long as the conjugal 
arrangement holds, land rights are well defined, but if 
marriage ends, the woman's access to land is at risk. In 
case of separation or death of the husband, the family 
of the husband often claims back the land which they 
have initially given to their son. This may even happen 
years after the passing of the man, in case he had a 
younger brother and the parents become in need to 
give out land. However, if the woman happens to 
become a widow, often a brother of the deceased 
husband takes over farm decision making. `Formally', 
the husband's family therefore still holds the land 
rights, but for the widow this implies that she is 
granted a means of survival, for the brother as the 
`representative' decision maker guarantees that she can 
keep the land (Davison 1988).  
In some other cases, the widow or separated woman 
may cultivate the land on behalf of one of her sons or 
brothers, which puts her into the same position as if a 
relative of the passed husband took over decision 
making power. Unmarried women may receive land 
from their father which enables these women to form 
an independent household. However, these women 
may not have control rights over the land because the 
father often keeps control such that in case one of his 
sons marries, he still has land at his disposal to give to 
his son (Davison 1988, Yngstrom 2002). Men on the 
other hand do not face such difficulties as tenure 
insecurity as they are favored through the traditional 
land distribution system.  
Although the examples bear some specificity for 
Kenya, it is easy to find examples from other ethnic 
groups other than the Kikuyu either in Kenya or other 
Eastern African countries where mechanisms of land 
allotment and marriage are very similar (for further 
examples and references see Davison 1988, Gopal 
amd Salim 1998, Yngstrom 2002). The constraints of 
widows bear similarity to those women left by their 
husbands (Gopal and Salim 1998). However, women 
may also seek divorce. This decision may be driven by 
the consideration that she can achieve a higher level of 
welfare outside marriage. Using data from Jamaica, 
(Handa 1996) finds that some women gain more from 
staying unmarried since they have independent access 
to resources. Regarding divorce, women may seek 
separation only when having secure access to land and 
exerting full decision making power.  
Another widespread phenomenon is the temporary 
out-migration of husbands seeking employment in 
urban areas. In Uganda it has been found that 
husbands---although absent---maintain the decision 
making power even when they are away from home 
over extended periods. Asked why they did not apply 
improved farming technologies, the women responded 
that they do not have the right to make decisions about 
investments (Kennedy and Peters 1992). In these 
households, men often still play a dominant role in 
household decision making while the woman is not 
allowed to decide about important on-farm 
investments.  
The examples cited provide a guideline for 
constructing different classes of FHH according to 
their marital status and the presence of a man who 
affects household decisions and determines tenure 
security. A widow who receives support from her sons 
is not exposed to the same constraints as a widow who 
needs to argue with her husband's family about the 
land. A FHH which emerged out of temporary 
outmigration is cropping under different constraints 
when the man still keeps the right for on-farm decision 
making compared to a fully responsible woman. All 
these different situations imply different constraints 
which affect agricultural production and thus lead to 
varying levels of productivity. The model developed 
in the next section aims to account for the 
heterogeneity of FHH while explaining the observed 
ambiguity of productivity levels of FHH. 
III. THE MODEL 
In order to derive the conditions under which FHH 
exhibit either higher, equal, or lower levels of 
productivity compared with MHH, I construct a 
household optimization model that allows for 
investigating labor supply decisions under two 
different states. The one state is achieved when the 
household's income is above the subjective poverty 
line. In this case, the standard model as the one by 
Sandmo predicts that risk averse farmers would reduce 
labor supply when exposed to tenure uncertainty. On 
the other hand, in the second state, farmers face the 
risk of falling below the poverty line that changes their 
response to tenure uncertainty. Reducing effort is not 
an option as it would imply becoming even poorer and   5 
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more deprived. In order to escape that trap, farmers 
need to increase effort to avoid becoming poorer. A 
major result of the model developed below is therefore 
that tenure insecurity does not necessarily lead to a 
reduction of labor supply, depending on which 
perception of risk prevails: (i) tenure uncertainty or (ii) 
the risk of falling short of income. The model is kept 
simple and considers only labor as an essential 
variable input. However, the model is generalizable to 
all other inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides or draft 
power as well. Land, the second important input, is 
considered fixed throughout the following analysis.  
I begin with a simple framework in which utility is 
maximized under perfect security, which will be 
extended later in the text. The farmer is endowed with 
a fixed amount of labor time T which she allocates 
across two different income generating activities: crop 
cultivation and off-farm work. If the farmer has the 
opportunity to generate off-farm income she receives a 
wage rate w so that her off-farm income will be wl, 
where  l denotes her off-farm labor supply. This 
activity does not need to be restricted to denote only 
wage labor, but w may also represent marginal returns 
to off-farm enterprises. Land A is cultivated using 
labor T-l which gives rise to a production function of 
the form q = f(T-l,A) for which it is assumed that f' > 0 
and ´f'' < 0, where f' and f'' denote the first and second 
derivative of f with respect to l. Each activity of the 
woman involves a cost which is captured by a function 
cw and cf  respectively, which share the usual 
properties of a cost function, that is c'>0 and c'' > 0. 
The costs arise from the disutility of labor. 
Alternatively, one may think of more sophisticated 
representations where the costs in cw arise from 
purchasing inputs for off-farm enterprises, from 
searching for a job, transportation, etc. Equivalently, 
one may extend cf to include the needs to purchase 
seeds, fertilizer or pesticides without substantial 
complication and without changing the basic results. 
However, for reasons of simplicity I focus on labor 
supply only and thus the only variable driving the cost 
function is l. Combining productive activities with the 
cost functions, the woman faces an income given by  
 
  y = wl - cw (l) + f(T-l, A) – cf (T-l)   (1) 
 
This equation describes the situation of a farmer 
who does not encounter any constraints other than her 
disutility and restrictions implied by wage rates and 
the technology applied. To capture tenure insecurity, 
let π(θ) be the probability that the farmer can retain the 
benefits from labor supply (or investments) in future 
periods. From π, we obtain expected returns from 
farming by 
 
 E(f(T-l, A)) = π(θ) · f(T-l, A) + (1- π(θ)) ·  0  (2) 
 
The probability π or the level of tenure security 
depends on the woman's level of bargaining power as 
she needs to defend her land against the claims of her 
husband's family. It is convenient for the subsequent 
analysis to assume that the bargaining power 
parameter $\theta$ directly translates into π such that θ 
= π. If the woman has the means to defend the land 
against claims of her husband's family, that is, if θ is 
equal to or close to 1, then she faces a high level of 
tenure security. Note that in the present framework π 
does not necessarily need to represent tenure security, 
but may equally denote the power to make on-farm 
investment decisions in case of absent husbands. In 
this regard, θ can also be interpreted as the power to 
exert the right to decide.  
The second modification concerns the probability 
that households only achieve a level of income below 
the poverty line. Very poor households need to define 
an income target that ensures a minimum welfare 
level, such as the satisfaction of a minimum level of 
nutrition, basic needs, etc. This income target is 
somewhat different from the usual notion of an 
income target that implies a backward bending labor 
supply curve where the target works as a threshold. In 
target income models, workers do not want to supply 
more labor, but value leisure higher than additional 
income, once the threshold has been achieved.
4 In the 
present setting, target income rather refers to a 
different concept, that is, farmers facing the risk of not 
achieving their minimum acceptable income, supply 
more labor in order to get as close as possible to the 
income target. Hence, households at risk of falling 
below their income target cannot afford to work less 
and thus exhibit a different cost function as compared 
                                                           
4. 
4 See Camerer et al. (1997) and Farber (2005) for investigations 
on target incomes and labor supply.   6 
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to a wealthy household. Obviously, the probability that 
a woman achieves her target is a function of available 
income and is denoted by p(y). 
Since y is a function of available land size A, returns 
from market labor w, total availability of labor time T, 
but also of bargaining power θ, we can write p 
equivalently as p(A,w,T, θ). p is the realization of a 
cumulative distribution function and is assumed to be 
increasing in all of its arguments. For instance, with 
rising wage rates, income increases as well as more 
labor is allocated to off-farm activities, which in turn 
increases the probability to achieve the income target. 
In the model below, the variable p affects the shape of 
the cost functions which flatten when p approaches 
zero.  
Combining tenure insecurity and the probability to 
achieve the income target with (1) and maximizing 
with respect to labor yields  
 
  w = pcw' + (θf' - pcf')     (3) 
 
Women allocate labor such that the going market 
wage rate equals the marginal cost of working plus the 
difference between marginal returns from labor and 
the marginal costs from farming. After solving for l, 
optimal labor supply can be expressed as a function of 
$\theta$ and p, as well as of A and w. Denote optimal 
labor supply as  l
*(θ, p, A, w). Applying the envelope 
theorem with respect to θ gives  
 
0
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
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since the numerator of the right hand side is positive 
as it is a scaled version of the right hand side of (3) 
which is positive, since 0 < p' < 1. The denominator is 
negative, because f'' < 0, cf'',  cw'' > 0 and thus (4) 
follows. Since l
* represents optimal off-farm labor 
supply, the negative sign of (4) implies that FHH 
increase farm labor once the level of tenure security 
improves. The results demonstrate that land is 
underutilized as long as income from farming is 
insecure.  
Since  l
* represents optimal off-farm labor supply, 
the negative sign of (4) implies that FHH increase 
farm labor once the level of tenure security improves. 
The results demonstrate that land is underutilized as 
long as income from farming is insecure. Labor is 
allocated until the farmer's marginal productivity 
equals her marginal costs. If tenure is insecure, that is, 
when θ<1, expected output decreases while generating 
a new production frontier which is illustrated by the 
lower dashed concave curve. As a response to lower 
expected returns, the farmer reduces labor supply until 
marginal productivity and marginal cost are just equal. 
This reduction of effort results in an accompanying 
decrease of output from q.  
However, if p decreases—e.g. due to a decrease of 
off-farm income— labor supply is increased in order 
to secure the achievement of the income target. The 
comparative statics regarding the change of the return 
from off-farm employment reveal 
 
' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' 1 *
f c p c p










    (5) 
 
Expression (5) is positive as long as the marginal 
disutility of labor in farming c’f is larger than the 
marginal disutility from working on the labor market 
c’w. This holds when labor markets are 
underdeveloped or wage rates are low, which are the 
cases I am focusing on. A positive sign of (???) 
implies that labor is withdrawn from agriculture and 
allocated to off-farm activities if the wage rate is 
rising. With no other options but farming available, 
households would employ all labor in agriculture 
yielding the first order conditions  
 
θf' = pc’f       (6) 
 
In order to analyze the impact of p and θ on farming 
efficiency, I focus on farming only and investigate the 
effects of farm labor supply in response to varying θ 
and  p while holding all other factors fixed. To 
facilitate the exposition, I focus on equation (6) and 
neglect for simplicity the existence of labor markets. It 
should be noted that the general result is not affected 
by this simplification. However, later I introduce off-
farm activities through investigating the effect of 
variations of the wage rate w on p. The crucial 
assumption is that p increases with w, which implies 
that households reallocate more and more labor 
towards the generation of income from off-farm 
activities. To see how labor allocation and   7 
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productivity is determined, I consider four cases 
summarized in table 1. 
Table 1 Different cases with missing labor markets 
Case 1  f’ = cf  θ =1;  p = 1  Average efficiency 
Case 2  θ f’ = cf  θ <1;  p = 1  Below average 
efficiency 
Case 3  f’ = pcf  θ =1;  p < 1  Above average 
efficiency 
Case 4  θ = pcf  θ <1;  p < 1  Indeterminate 
 
In case 1, the woman has achieved full tenure 
security and achieves target income with probability 1. 
That is, wage rates or land size are large enough to 
ensure that p=1. In this case, household production is 
only constrained by personal disutility of labor and the 
household achieves average levels of productivity. 
Case 2 refers to women for whom tenure is insecure, 
implying that labor supply is below average. The FHH 
allocates labor such that the marginal productivity of 
farming equals the marginal cost. But since θ<1, the 
expected marginal returns are lower compared to case 
1 households, implying that marginal costs must be 
lower as well. Consequently case 2 households exhibit 
a lower supply of labor and therefore lower output. In 
case 3, the curvature of the cost function is flattened 
through the impact of the low probability to achieve 
the income target. Hence, labor supply must be above 
average and, given land and labor time T, the 
household produces more than a case 1 household. 
Finally, in case 4 both factors, tenure insecurity and 
low probability to achieve target income, affect labor 
supply decisions. The location of these households 
relative to the efficiency frontier depends on the 
curvature of the production and cost functions which 
is determined by θ and p. This implies that empirically 
this case cannot be distinguished from the other three 
cases when only production output is observed. Given 
the shape of the two functions, labor supply might be 
above, below or even exactly equal to case 1 
households. An appealing feature of the model as 
summarized by the four cases is that it allows for 
explaining different levels of productivity even in the 
absence of labor markets.  
The four cases in table 1 further imply another 
result: with increasing w, p increases as well and the 
impact of tenure insecurity in case 4 becomes stronger. 
To see this, consider the production outcome qm, 
which is the level of production of a case 4 household 
and define the production outcomes qu and ql for case 
2 and case 3 as upper and lower bounds respectively. 
Since in households for which case 4 applies θ<1 and 
p<1 the household's production outcome qm is located 
somewhere between qu and ql. But with increasing p, 
the case 4 household approaches and eventually 
transforms into a case 2 household. Consequently, qm 
approaches  qu which is associated with case 2 
households; household production declines. The 
opposite case can be constructed when p is kept fixed 
and one allows θ to increase.  
The model shows that the farmer's response to 
tenure insecurity is state dependent. When the farmer 
faces the risk of an income shortfall, the effect of 
tenure insecurity is overcompensated by the effect of p 
and output may not be decreased at all or may even be 
higher as in households exhibiting the same levels of θ 
but large values of p. For relatively wealthier farmers, 
there is only a small risk of becoming poorer, which 
why tenure insecurity exerts its full effect in 
decreasing production. That is, with given bargaining 
power  θ and given probability p to achieve target 
income, FHH are either more, equally or less efficient 
compared to a MHH.
5 Using the model it is possible to 
explain the seemingly contradicting findings from the 
various empirical studies that have been concerned 
with agricultural production and the comparison of 
FHH and MHH. These findings have implications for 
empirical studies as well: the different states can only 
be identified when the levels of θ and p are 
appropriately controlled for. 
 
IV. THE DATA 
The data used in this study stems from the Kenyan 
Welfare Monitoring Survey III, which has been 
conducted during 1997 and covers more than 11,000 
households. However, due to a large number of 
missing responses on agricultural inputs and urban 
                                                           
5 In principal it is possible that a MHH correspond to a case 
1 or case 3 household. However, it is assumed that there is 
no characteristic other than low off-farm incomes that is 
systematically related to case 3. So, when joining all MHH 
within a single category, MHH must be on average more 
productive compared to a FHH to which case 3 applies.   8 
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households not engaged in agriculture, the total 
sample size reduces to 4,088 observations. The FHH 
indicator builds on self-reported headship to achieve 
comparability with other studies. The data allows for 
distinguishing different categories of FHH according 
to the three criteria (i) marital status, (ii) demographic 
characteristics and (iii) main household decision 
maker. Marital status, which is a standard question in 
most large scale household surveys, is probably the 
most obvious feature to categorize FHH. The 
questionnaire includes the categories married, never 
married, widowed, divorced or separated, and whether 
the household is part of a polygamous household 
compound. In almost all households of the married 
category, no husband is currently staying at home and 
thus these are named henceforth Temporary. A second 
category covered by the data is whether the woman is 
divorced or separated. For this category it would be 
desirable to know who initiated the separation as it 
may affect the results, since women who seek divorce 
may be well prepared to live outside the household 
(e.g. through land ownership, wage employment, etc.). 
Women who have been left by their partners might be 
in a much less favorable situation (Gopal and Salim 
1998). Divorced women are termed Divorced. The 
next category consists of widows and is named 
accordingly. Women who have never been married are 
called  Single and finally women from polygamous 
households are classified under the heading 
Polygamous. It would be desirable to distinguish 
single women according to their choice of being 
unmarried, that is, whether land endowment has 
influenced the choice not to marry. Although, of the 
single women in the sample, only four indicate that a 
male non-relative resides permanently in the 
household, this does not imply that these women do 
not have a male partner. The partner may just not live 
with the woman in the same household. 
The final characteristic used for classifying FHH 
refers to the main household decision maker, which 
determines the categories de jure and de facto FHH, 
whereas in the former category, women are considered 
as having control over household decisions while the 
de facto category denotes FHH in which not the 
woman does on-farm decisions but a male relative. 
The questionnaire contains a question on who decides 
on farm investments. The answer is taken here as an 
indication of the true head of household: FHH where 
the woman is responsible for farm investments are 
allocated into the de jure category and classified as de 
facto otherwise. Note, that these categories do not 
immediately imply the status of bargaining power, 
which is determined only in combination with marital 
status. In total, eight different categories emerge from 
applying these categories to the data. The different 
classes mainly arise from distinguishing the marital 
status with respect to de jure or de facto FHH. To 
facilitate exposition the categories are abbreviated DJ 
and  DF respectively.
6 Only unmarried and 
polygamous households are treated as special cases 
and are not further categorized according to the 
decision maker.  
The meaning of the terms de jure and de facto FHH 
as applied in this study does not entirely correspond to 
its common use (see Kennedy and Peters (1992) for an 
early application). The category de jure is usually used 
to classify widows, divorced and separated, as well as 
single FHH, while de facto refers to households where 
the woman is married but her husband is mostly not 
present. However, the terms are used here to further 
distinguish these FHH categories, as the sole 
application of the de jure and de facto categories fall 
short of fully capturing the true household decision 
maker.  
Finally, it is necessary to analyze the levels of 
bargaining power of the women from the respective 
household categories. As in the previous section, the 
term bargaining power is only used for brevity and 
should not be taken literally, as DF Temporary are not 
threatened to lose their land, but are characterized by 
low levels of decision making power. Since the absent 
husbands still aim to control farm investments, these 
households are characterized by low levels of 
bargaining power. DJ Temporary households on the 
opposite fully control farm investments and hence 
exhibit high levels of θ. Among widows, those with 
male support, that is, where a male relative has the 
principal right to decide on farm investments, have a 
                                                           
5. 
6 There are 28 households in the DF Temporary category who 
indicate that a husband is present. This seems to be unusual and 
may be the result of misreporting. Excluding these household 
leaves the results unchanged. When forming an extra category 
of these households, the new category exhibits the same signs 
and levels of significance as the DF Temporary category. I 
therefore decided to keep these households as DF Temporary.   9 
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better bargaining position than their counterparts, 
where the woman is fully on her own. Thus, DF 
Widows have high levels of bargaining power while 
DJ Widows are at permanent risk that the husband's 
family claims back the land.  
V. EMPIRICS 
 
The goal of the empirical analysis is to detect 
different levels of productivity among FHH which 
point to different exposure to tenure insecurity and 
low levels of decision making power. I first estimate 
the efficiency frontier using a variable cost function 
and in a second step investigate whether deviations 
from the frontier are systematically related to different 
kinds of FHH. Tenure insecurity is determined by the 
household's level of bargaining power, which is shown 
for each household type in table \ref{signs where the 
first column is repeated from table \ref{bargaining to 
facilitate the exposition of the empirical strategy. To 
determine where households are located relative to the 
efficiency frontier, a dummy variable is introduced 
into the cost function that accounts for each FHH 
category. A significant dummy implies a shift of that 
household category either closer to or further away 
from the efficiency frontier as compared to the 
average MHH. Given the estimation approach 
employed and described below, a negative result 
implies higher efficiency scores while a positive 
parameter indicates that the respective household is 
less productive.  
Furthermore, the empirical exercise aims to 
discover state dependent responses to insecurity. The 
fundamental result of the model is that tenure 
insecurity exerts a different effect in each regime with 
implications for labor supply and productivity. Also, 
for households with perfect security the different 
regimes have efficiency implications as is evident 
from cases 3 and 1. The regime is determined by p, 
which represents the risk of falling short of income. 
The level of p is measured by the level of off-farm 
income generated by the respective household. The 
off-farm income is interacted with the dummy in order 
to determine the category specific effect. Its 
interpretation is simple: when the sign is significantly 
positive, then with increasing income the levels of 
farm inefficiency increase as well because households 
allocate more labor away from farming toward off-
farm activities. This implies an undercultivation of the 
available land and thus increasing inefficiency.  
To be able to interpret the results, it is necessary to 
clarify the possible assignment of households to the 
four cases. Column 3 of table \ref{signs gives an 
account of which FHH category can be assigned to 
which case. The table further contains in column 4 and 
5 the signs of the dummy variables that are conform to 
the predictions of the theory developed in the previous 
chapter. By the definition of the FHH categories, the 
only households facing low levels of θ are DF 
Temporary and DJ Widow households. This implies 
that these households can be assigned to either case 2 
or case 4. Hence, based on the theory one would 
expect these two household categories to be more, 
equally or less efficient compared to MHH, when 
controlling for all other determinants of productivity. 
Which one of these three possibilities hold is an 
empirical question. When the sign is negative, the 
household belongs to case 4 because this is the only 
one of the two cases that allows above average levels 
of productivity (see table \ref{cases). When the 
coefficient is insignificant, the household may also be 
a case 4 household due to the same reason, as the 
effects from θ and p may just neutralize each other.
7 
When the sign of the dummy turns out to be 
significantly positive it is not possible to 
unambiguously assign the households to case 4 or case 
2 as both cases allow for this option. However, as 
explained below, the information from the interaction 
term can be used to recover the case to which the 
household category belongs to.  
DJ Temporary and DF Widow households are 
expected to be either equal to a case 1 or case 3 
household as tenure insecurity does not affect them 
because of their high levels of bargaining power. The 
theory predicts that these households are either more 
or equally productive compared to average MHH, 
depending on the perception of income risk. Estimates 
of levels of productivity for this class of FHH are 
therefore predicted to be either negative or 
insignificant. A negative estimate means that these 
households are more productive than average MHH 
                                                           
6. 
7 An insignificant parameter may also imply that neither tenure 
insecurity nor low levels of p determine productive outcomes.   10 
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and thus are assigned to case 3. An insignificant 
parameter implies that there is no difference to the 
average MHH which is assumed to be equivalent to a 
case 1 household. Since it is unknown whether the 
remaining four FHH categories have on average a high 
or low value of θ no expectations can be formulated 
beforehand. 
The theory further implies that households which 
are initially case 3 or case 4 households can transform 
into case 1 and case 2 households respectively. That is, 
with increasing off-farm income, p is increasing and 
case 3 and 4 households eventually switch from one 
state into another. As laid out above, whether such 
transition exists is tested via the inclusion of an 
interaction term where off-farm income is interacted 
with each FHH category. Here again, the model 
implies some restrictions. Transiting from one state 
into another implies that households which have 
initially been a case 3 or case 4 household must 
become more inefficient with increasing incomes. 
That is, if a transition occurs, then the interaction term 
must be positive, meaning that when off-farm income 
activities become more attractive, more labor is 
allocated away from farming toward the off-farm 
income activity and levels of productivity decrease.  
However, the theory offers even more restrictions: 
DJ Temporary and DF Widow can only exhibit a 
transition from case 3 to case 1 if case 3 households 
exist at all. This can easily be checked by referring to 
the dummy variable estimate of these households. If 
the dummy does not become significantly negative, 
there are no case 3 households and a transition cannot 
occur. For DF Temporary and DJ Widow this 
restriction does not hold, since the insignificance of 
the productivity estimate still does not exclude these 
categories from being case 4 households. However, if 
a transition occurs, that is, the interaction term 
becomes significantly positive, then an insignificant 
dummy variable unambiguously implies a case 4 
household. 
A problem inherent to the empirical implementation 
of production functions in the context of cross-
sectional household data is recursive causality. In most 
production settings, the input quantities must be 
considered as choice variables, because input 
quantities are chosen on past experience and thus on 
expected output. This implies that the choice of input 
quantities is not independent of the level of output. 
However, in this case, inputs are correlated with the 
error term. The same can be expected for all variable 
inputs where the decision on the quantities is likely to 
be determined by the expected amount or past 
realizations of output. Therefore, estimates from a 
production function using cross-sectional data should 
be treated with caution as the parameters are likely to 
be inconsistent due to the endogeneity of the 
independent variables (see Griliches and Mairesse 
(1998) for an extensive account of the problems 
involved when estimating production functions using 
cross sectional data). 
The problem of endogeneity can be circumvented 
by estimating a cost function rather than a production 
function. When the optimization problem of the 
producer is reformulated such that the agent minimizes 
costs, given input prices, output quantities and a 
production technology, a cost function results. Under 
the assumption that farmers are price takers on a 
competitive market, output quantities are assumed to 
be exogenously given since in a competitive market 
the farmer chooses his output based on output prices 
which are exogenous as well (Jorgenson 1986). The 
fundamental result of duality theory is that the cost 
function is the dual formulation of the production 
function, that is, the same optimizing behavior leads to 
the same outcomes: minimizing costs at given prices 
implies maximizing production at given inputs Under 
the assumption that the farm-households are price 
takers, all input prices can be treated as exogenous.  
Productivity or efficiency can be decomposed into 
technical and allocative efficiency. However, the 
predictions based on the theoretical model developed 
in the previous section do not distinguish between the 
two kinds of efficiency. Higher productivity and 
output may be achieved by either better usage of 
existing inputs or by using more of one input. 
Therefore, to investigate the empirical content of the 
model, an approach is needed that can handle both 
technical and allocative efficiency. Other than the 
production function approach, the efficiency 
measurement embedded into a cost function is capable 
of capturing technical and allocative efficiency. A 
further advantage of the cost function is that it easily 
accommodates multi-output production schemes   11 
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which is particularly relevant for societies dominated 
by agriculture as it is the case in Kenya. \newline  
In this study I focus on smallholder farming and 
exclude large commercial farms as these can be 
assumed to produce with a technology which is likely 
to differ substantially from those of the smallscale 
farmers. The median size of a smallscale farm in the 
sample is 3 hectares. All farms larger than the 95th 
percentile (22.5 hectares) are treated as large scale 
farms and are excluded from the sample. 
Prices are available for hired labor and draft power. 
Prices for family labor are computed by the approach 
suggested by Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994) while 
using the number of household members working in 
farming. Estimating family shadow wages is necessary 
in order to account for the observed difference 
between market wages and the family shadow price 
for labor (Menon et al. 2005). The data also contains 
information on hourly labor supply, but this data is 
considered extremely noisy as it is based on recall and 
is subject to a large number of missing cases. 
Furthermore, it covers only a week and does not 
account for any seasonal variations. Land is 
considered fixed, which is a reasonable assumption as 
land markets are largely unavailable in rural Kenya. I 
further consider fertilizer, pesticides and manure used, 
for which dummy variables are included when the 
respective input has been applied.  
Since most households plant a relatively large 
portfolio of different crops, the output quantities are 
divided into three major output classes: maize and 
cereals, vegetables and fruits, and cash crops. As 
further controls for the choice of technology, I include 
a dummy for the educational background of the head 
of household (primary and secondary schooling) as 
well as dummy variables indicating whether the 
household applies labor intensive irrigation. 
Furthermore, a dummy has been included for 
households which have been visited by an extension 
agent. A translog variable cost function is applied with 
the usual constraint imposed. 
VI. RESULTS 
The cost function is estimated using a stochastic 
frontier approach, which has been established as a 
standard tool for investigating the production of cost 
efficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). The 
stochastic frontier approach aims at estimating a cost 
or production frontier and to determine the distance of 
each farmer from the efficiency frontier. The empirical 
model is specified as  
 
  ln VC = f(P, Q, Y) + ν + u    (5) 
 
where  f(·) has a translog functional form and its 
arguments refer to prices, fixed inputs and output 
respectively. ν denotes a random component assumed 
to be distributed as ν ~ N(0, σ
2) and u is a systematic 
measure of cost efficiency for which u > 0 must hold. 
Negative values for u are prohibited since it is 
assumed that producers do not produce at negative 
costs. The interpretation of the efficiency measure u is 
simple: since f(·) represents the efficiency frontier 
large values of u imply large deviations from f(·) and 
therefore high levels of inefficiency. Since u cannot 
become negative it needs to be modelled using an 
asymmetric distribution. The likelihood function 
constructed here is based on the exponential 
distribution, which is an asymmetric distribution and 
has achieved standard usage beside the half normal 
distribution.  
The efficiency measure is modelled as  
 
u = α +  δ’x +  η     (6) 
 
where x consists of (i) the FHH dummy indicators 
and (ii) the set of interaction terms, where income 
from other sources than farming is interacted with the 
FHH dummies to account for household specific levels 
of  p. Off-farm activities include income from wage 
labor, profits from business and remittances. The 
properties of the measure of inefficiency imply that 
negative parameter estimates for δ are associated with 
greater efficiency.  
After inserting model (6) is inserted into (5) the 
model is estimated, the parameters of which are 
presented in table ??? The parameter of DJ Widow is 
negative and significant at the 5 percent level 
indicating that the average state of the household after 
controlling for alternative sources of income 
corresponds to case 4. The negative sign implies that 
given land endowments and prices {DJ Widow 
households are on average more efficient compared to   12 
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MHH. The coefficients of all other household 
categories do not achieve any usual level of 
significance. {DJ Widow households are therefore not 
only more productive than MHH but also compared to 
the remaining FHH categories as well. Regarding case 
4, the negative sign implies that the probability that 
these households are threatened by shortfalls of 
income and thus need to achieve higher levels of 
productivity is higher as compared to the other 
household categories. Since neither {DF Widows nor 
{DJ Temporary households are affected by low 
bargaining power, case 4 is ruled out and thus these 
households must be assigned to case 1. For the other 
for FHH categories it is not possible to determine the 
level of bargaining power beforehand, making it 
impossible to draw unambiguous conclusions. These 
household categories may either be equal to case 1 or 
case 4 households.  
 
Table 2 Estimated parameters 
Dummy variables                   
      
DJ Temporary    0.016    0.259
DF Temporary    -0.044    -0.978
DJ Widow    -0.094**    -2.09
DF Widow    -0.033    -0.82
DJ Divorce    -0.034    0.708
DF Divorce    0.118    1.379
Single    0.147    -0.200
Polygamous    -0.043    -0.711
      
Interaction terms                   
      
DJ Temporary    0.024    1.339
DF Temporary          0.034**    2.93
DJ Widow          0.038**    2.62
DF Widow    -0.002    0.202
DJ Divorce    -0.03    -0.52
DF Divorce    -0.005    -0.183
Single    0.029    0.638
Polygamous    -0.013    -0.788
Numbers in the second column refer to the parameters and the 
third column to associated t-values. 
 
The interaction term for DF Temporary is 
significant and positive indicating that the low 
decision making competence increases farm 
inefficiency as soon as income from other sources 
rises. This result suggests a transition of {DF 
Temporary households from case 4 to case 2. The 
insignificant parameter for the dummy variable may 
thus be interpreted such that in the first stage {DF 
Temporary households correspond to case 4 where the 
effects induced by p and θ neutralize each other, that 
is, the positive productivity effect emerging from low 
values of p is compensated by the negative efficiency 
impact that arises from low values of θ. {DJ Widow 
households reveal a significantly positive parameter 
for the interaction term, too. Both cases are conform to 
the hypotheses that the negative impact of tenure 
insecurity on farming becomes increasingly apparent 
with rising p. However, tenure insecurity affects only 
households where women are left with low decision 
making power or where they are threatened of losing 
their land, that is, only households facing low levels of 
θ exhibit increasing inefficiency with rising off-farm 
incomes. All other households just achieve the same 
levels of average efficiency that characterizes MHH. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper I have investigated the interrelatedness 
of response to tenure insecurity (and low decision 
power) and income risk. The results suggest that 
depending on which of these risks prevails, FHH are 
either less, equally or more productive compared to 
MHH. If the connection between these risks is not 
appropriately controlled for, empirical analysis would 
yield biased results. For the case of Kenya, FHH 
would seem equally productive compared to MHH and 
tenure insecurity would not appear to play a role in 
labor allocation decisions. Previous studies on this 
issue finding that FHH turn out to be even more 
productive (e.g. Moock 1976) do not offer an 
explanation for this finding and also seem to suggest 
that FHH fare better compared to MHH. However, the 
model developed in this paper shows that households 
are only more efficient when facing income risks and 
thus allows for explaining higher levels of productivity 
of FHH. Furthermore, the model allows to reconcile 
the finding of higher levels of productivity among 
FHH with the often repeated result that FHH are   13 
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actually less productive, through integrating the 
concepts of income risk and tenure insecurity. Judging 
from the empirical results, both risks seem to be 
credible and FHH respond to them.  
A second important result that came up in this study 
is that FHH categories are significantly different from 
each other, such that, when FHH are joined into a 
single household category, any analysis of 
productivity in rural areas falls short of capturing the 
specific constraints each of these household categories 
is facing. The results imply that tenure insecurity and 
the lacking ability to decide on investments are visible 
in only a few categories, revealing an impact on 
productivity in two household categories only. The 
findings are consistent with the assumption that male 
influence or bargaining power appears to be a factor 
that determines household production decisions. It is 
interesting to note that even within seemingly 
homogeneous categories like widows, divorced or 
temporary FHH there are significant differences. The 
findings suggest that a rethinking of the concept of 
FHH with regard to production and access to 
resources, but possibly also in the context of welfare, 
time use etc. would help to uncover structural 
discrimination and its sources.  
The results point to the potential underestimation of 
the negative effects arising from tenure security when 
the FHH category specific constraints are not 
controlled for. This finding suggests that in previous 
studies the effect of tenure insecurity may turn out to 
be too low, which emphasizes the need and again 
raises the question for secure land right regimes for 
women and men. Only the granting of secure access to 
productive resources is a viable means to improve 
productivity of women farmers in the long run. 
Insecure access to land has further implications as in 
rural areas it directly translates into the impossibility 
to obtain credits and to expand into further income 
generating activities. The finding that some FHH 
achieve higher production efficiency does not 
invalidate the necessity of targeted programs for 
women, but in view of the theory call for a refinement 
of the legal system and the status of women. 
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